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Monetary Policy in a Game - Theoretic Framework
Spieltheoretische Ans~tze zur Geldpolitik
By Jac J. Sijben'), Tilburg
1. Introduction
In the last decade the classical controversy about the pre-announcement of rules
versus a discretionary monetary policy has been revitalized. This renaissance was linked
with the rise and tht further development of the rational expectations theory or
new-classical economics on the one side and with its implicacions for the effectiveness of
macroeconomic stabilization policy on the ocher side (Sijben, 1980). [n this concext
empirical research with regard to the ineffectiveness-postulate (Lucas, Sargenc and
Wallacej was also strongly emphasized (Barro, 1977).
- In the sevencies the debace wich regard co the inefEectiveness of economic scabilization
policy did repel gradually the tradicional Keynesian-monetarisc controversy about the
intluence of monetary and fiscal policy in the sixties. However at the same time a new
policy-issue came about which put the debace on monetary-policy behavior in a
game-theoretic framew-ork. This issue refers to the fact thac in the course of rime
policy-makers will be tempted to change cheir original policy-stracegy wich regard to
the intlation-unemploymenc trade-off. In che literacure this question is known as "the
cime inconsistency of optimal plans" (Kydland and Prescott, 1977 and Taylor, 198~)
and is closely related to che concepts oE credibiliry and repucacion of the central bank. ~1c
the end of the seventies its aaencion was exciced when in several countries central banks
were changing their poliey-behaviour, accompanied by a sharp reduction in economic
activiry. [n ocher words it appeared thac in pracnce a disinflauon policy was very costly,
requiring large, albeit temporary, increases in unemployment. (1979-1983 in the UK
and the US). This developmenc resulted from che fact that during the seventies the public
had losc its confidence in the ceneral bank with regard to the uphold of monetary
stabiliry and workers and business had adjusced wages and prices in accordance wich
their inflationary expectations. In this strong inflationary environmenc a change of the
monetary-regime, a disinflaáon strategy, will confronc poliey makers wich a rise in
unemploymenc and a slackening of economic activiry. The mearung of che "time-
inconsisteney problem" with regard co che macro-economic scabilizacion policy is
expressed by Taylor (1983, p. 123) as follows, "The possible time inconsistency of
optimal policy is one of rhe most important policy issues chat has emerged Erom
reseaich on rational txpectacions in macro-economics".
') The ~uthor is Professor of !vlonetary Economics at Tilburg Universiry and rhe Posrgraduate
School of Financial Economic ~lanagemenr, Tilburg, The Netherlands.
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This essav deals with a non-technical review of the current issues in the international
literature in the fiefd of the game-theoretic approach m monetary policy. Especiall,v the
importance of credibility and reputation of policy makers wirh regard to the
formulanon and the implementation of monetary policy will be emphasized. According
to this approach the interaaion process between the strategic behaviour of the policy
maker and the public will result in an endogenous monetary poli~y. The tradicional
view according to which the public responds to monetary impulses in a rather
mechanical and predictable way will be abandoned.
Based on the stimulating articles of Kydland-Prescort on the one side and of
Barro-Gordon and Backus-Driffill on the other side, in section Z the modern
game-theoretic approach in monetary policy will be presenced. In rhis section it will be
shown that in an environment with rational economic agenrs the choices of monetary
authorities with regard to their policy behavior in a Phillips-curve analysis will be
restricred essennally. This results from the fact thac a discrecionary monetary policv has
to be abandoned, because in the long run the macroeconomic pay-off in terms of
inflarion and emplovment will be less beneficial than in case of scicking to a
pre-announced monetary growth rule. This conclusion is not based on Friedman's
previous well-known arguments with regard to the variable lags and the timing and
uncerrainry in monetary policy, but is rather based on the game-theoretic víew that
"economic planning is not a game against nature but, rather, a game against rational
economic agen[s". (Kydland and Prescott, 19", p. ~~3). Section 3 deals with the
importance of asvmmetric information berween the policy maker and the public on the
one hand and with the impact of the degree of mdependence of the central bank on the
effectiveness of monetary polie~r on rhe other hand. Finally section -~ concludes with
some summarizing remarks.
2. A Game-theor'etic Appsoach
Credibiliry
Since the introduaion of the racional expeaations theory (Lucas, Sargent, Wallace)
and the concomitant Lucas-criuque in the seventies, much attencion has been given to
the impact of credibiliry of policymakers in analysing the quesnon about rules versus
discretion in monetary policy. The last few years the concepts of credibiliry and
resoluteness of policy actions have been emphasized very strongly in considerations
about the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Fellner, who intro-
duced this concept in macroeconomia, has pointed out thac the adjusement process
during che transition period to lower inflation will be longer and more costly in terms of
a loss of production and employment the less credible the anti-inflation policy ( Fellner,
1979 and McCallum, 1984). This concept is very crucial because che inflationary
expectations of the rational public will determine ultimately the abiliry of policymak-
ers, the central banks, to achieve their final objecrives. [n their turn these inIlationary
expectations are dependent on the public's assessmenc of the credibiliry of cencral bank
behavior.
In the líterature on monetary theory credibiliry is defined as che extenc to which the
~rational economic agents do believe that a change in the monetary regime occurred at
the moment this poliey change actually took place. [n this concext McCallum points
out, "Credibiliry obtains to che extent that beliefs concerning poliey conform co che way
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in which policy is acrually being conducted and to official announcements about its
conduc[" ( McCallum, 1984, p. 105). This means that a new monecary policy-regime
will be credible as it is believed immediately, notwithstanding the fact whether this new
policy involves higher or lower inflation. Subsequently it is also very important that
each moment the policy is consistent with the information of rhe public with regard to
the objectives and limitations of the central bank. Therefore a monetary policy
announcement will be less credible when the public is convinced that the policy
intention is incompatible with the currcnc targets of policymakers ( Cukierman,
1986).
In the course of the seventies, characterized by a high inflationary environment in the
industrializcd countries, central banks got increasingly convinced of the significance of
maintaining the credibiliry of their anti-intlation policy. ln this decade the rate of
intlation has been increased by the rise of oil-prices and excessive wage-demands on the
one side and by an expansive fiscal policy on the other side. In these circumstances the
public became very sceprical about the possibilines and in particular about the
willingness of central banks to maintain monetary stabiliry. During the seventies two
views have been put forward co reduce and to eliminate the accelerated rate of intlation.
On the one hand an anti-intlation programme aiming at a gradual and predictable
reduaion of the rare of intlation ( gradualism) and on the other hand a more radical
programme emphasizing an immediate reduction of the rate of intlation ( commitment).
These policy recommendations retlect the different views with regard to the speed of
wage-and-price adjustments (contraca, institutions) and the concomitant costs in
terms of produczion and employment. The success of both programmes is crucially
dependent on the degree of policy-credibiliry. .~1 lack of credibiliry will hinder a
sufficient reduction of inflationary expeaations, increasing the probabiliry of a
recession. [n the seventies monetary policymakers in several counrries have conceded
the wage- and price demands of trade unions and firms and the budget-deficits of the
governments, feeding the arise and the self-generating inflationary processes. It is
obvious that in such an inflationary environment the classical debate about rules versus
discretion in monetary policy will be revitalized. The game-theoretic approach in
monetary policy was initiated by the Lucas-critique and the concomitant interaaion
becween the strategies of the players of the game (policymaker and the public).
The Kydland-Prescoct Analysis
As is well-known from the literature the issue of the most appropriate monetary
policy strategy has always been strongly emphasized in economics. ~lfter the secónd
world war, based on Keynesian cconomics, it was put forward that in the framework of
economic stabilization policy a discrctionary policy could always replace a fixed
monetary growth-rule. For it was reasoned ~hat smart policymakers could always make
use of the lack of fuU information abouc the working of the economic process (private
information) in implementing monetary policy. In this context Barro notes, "there is a
substantive role for monetary policy only ro the extent thac the monetary authoriry has
better information than the public" (Barro, 1976, p. Z6). A decade later he poincs ouc
this vie~v as follows, "Then if the policymaker was also well-meaning, therc was no
obvious defense for using a rule in order ro bind his hands in advance" (Barro, 1985, p-
23).
This view, which still gives some room for discretionary policy, was hesvily criticized
in an eluadate and stimulanng article by Kydland and Prescoa (197', ). Dunng the
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eighcies their analvsis had a strong influence as well on the theory of macro-economicstabilization policv as on the issue of internarional coordination of economic policy.
The nucleus of the recent research on the game-theoretic approach in monetary policyrefers to the costs of disintlation policy in terms of production and employment on theone hand and ro the question how to formulate and implemenr this policy co minimizechese costs on the other hand. Kydland and Prescott point out that a credible and steadv
preannounced monetary policy rule always generates a better pay-off in terms ofintlation and employment than a discretionary policy, when the macroeconomic
outcomes are dependent on the expectations with regard to future monetary policy
(Lucas-cririque). In this context the several political institutions also play a crucial role
in formulating and implementing economic policy and in the ultimate course of the
economic process. :~lesina and Tabellini explain it as follows, "The basic motivation ofthe novel literature on credibiliry and politics is that it is not harmless ro abstract frompolitical institutions in modelling economic policy. The recent theorv of economic
policy views policy making as a game becween the policymaker and the private agents in
the economy" (Alesina and Tabellini, 1988, p. 452 and ,~lesina, 1987). In the lastdecade the game-theoretic concept of credibility also played a significant role in thecontest of the need for an mternational coordination of economic policies to correa the
financial imbalances in the world economy. This results Erom the fact thar a svstem of
flexible exchange rates has appeared not to be able to eliminate the mutual
interdependence of economic policies between countries. (~tiller and Wallace, 198~
and Hamada, 1974). Vloreover the game-theoretic approach is also practised in theinteractions between monetary and fiscal poliey (central bank versus the Treasury)
(Tabellini, 1986).
The following considerations are based on two elucidate essavs of Cukierman and
Barro-Gordon respectively, which point ouc the essential characteristics oE rhe
Kydland-Prescoa game-theoretic approach quite concisely (Cukierman, 1986, Barro-
Gordon 1983-b and Backus-Driffill, 1985). In the basic-model macroeconomic policy
is characterized as a non-repeated game (single stage or one-shot game), in which the
cencral bank determines the actual rate of inflation (;t) and the public builds-up its
indationary expectations (z'). The game consists of rhe players (the policymaker and
the public), the strategies and the outcomes of the players. It is obvious that the
time-dimension plays a critical role in game theory. In a non-repeated game the game isplayed only one time. This means that no confrontations betwcen the players have
occurred nor in rhe past nor at presenc, so avoiding che influence of confrontacions on
actual behavior. It also implies that in this simple game strategic interactions between
the players will noc come about. Moreover this analysis refers to a non-cooperative
game, implying that there is no precommitment about rules of the game. In this way che
players are quite free to choose their optimal policy-strategy. However in a
cooperative-game the possibiliry exists to tune the strategy-choices to each other.
The basic-model, focusing on the Phillipscurve trade-off between inflation and
employment, consists of the following Eundamental relations.
YF - YN t (n - ;t') (1j
~ YF: actual produaion
YN: natural production
a: actual rare of inflation ( rate of monetary growth)
:t': expected rate of inflation
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This equarion refers to the well-known Lucas-supply function pointing out that
deviauons from the natural level of produaion ( employment) are positively related co
che unexpected race of intlacion. In other words expectations-errors with regard co
intlation generace real etfecrs. This view is based either on a short-run Phillipscurve
according to Lucas ( general versus relative prices) or on a supply-funaion in che context
ot the contract cheory according to Fischer-Taylor with price and wage rigidiry~)
(Sijben, 1980). For simpliciry ir is assumed chat the rate of monetary growth ( m) always
equals the rate of intlacion ( :t), while the expected rare of monetary growch (m')
derermines rhe expected rate of inflacion (tt').
Subsequently an objective function of the cencral bank is assumed according to which
monetary auchoricies attach a negative weight co inflati~n while they value an increase
of production and employment (YF 1 Y~) positívely. The macro-economic ouccome
(Uo) of the policymaker can be described as follows:
Uo--zzta(YF-Y;~),a~0. (2)
The chird equarion refers to che objective function of the public, emphasizing a rational
public which dislikes to be fooled by the policymakers by organizing a surprise intlation
(a - Z' ~ 0). In other words che public prefers a zero-surprise intlauon which,
according co equacion ( 1), implies an actual rate of unemploymenr equal to the natural
rate of unemployment. The outcome of the public ( UP) can be rendered as follows:
UP--(Z-a')'- (3)
The public knows rhe poliey behavior of the cenrral bank and will accordingly
decermine the inflationary expectations ( n`) which play a crucial role in the process of
wage-demands. .~ zero intlation and the concomicant monecary policy will be
considered optimal because the public dislikes intlation. [n these circumstances the
aaual and the expected rate of intlauon will be zero ( rc -;t' - 0) and so there is no
fooling of the public. This means char che level of aaual production coinddes with the
level of natural produaion ( YF - YN) (equation 1).
Based on this model monetary policy will become endogenousl,v. This results from
the Eact thar che polieymaker is maximizing its objective function caking inro account
the rational behavior oE the public. This implies an inceraction becween the polieymaker
and che public which, according to the game-theorenc analysis, can be descnbed in rhe
following way (Backus and Driffill, 1985). As was pointed ouc before policymakers and
the public are involved in a macroeconomic non-cooperacive game aimed at the fixation
of a rate oE inflation and an employmenc level.
Substitutingequation (1) in (2) the foUowingobjective function of the policymaker in
rerms of the rare of intlation results: -
U~- -z-fa(a-a'),a70.
r! Thc,Lucas-supply relarionship can also be formulaeed as a varianr of Friedman's narural ra[e
ot unemploymenr hyporhesis:
i- z' - ~(Uy-UF), è 1 0. U~; and UF refcr ro rhe narural and the aaual rarc of unemploymenc
respecuvely. ln rhe course of time rhe narural race of unemploymenr can cise because of marker
disrurbances especially wirh regard ro imperfecnons on che labour markcc.
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~lccording to the Backus-Driffill analysis ( 1985), the factor a represents the
policv-preference or the weights polieymakers attach in their objective funezion to
inflation and employment. It is assumed that a has a numerical value of 2. A higher
numerical value of the parameter a represents a higher prioriry given to an elimination
of unemployment and a stimulation of economic activiry above monetary stabiliry.
It is assumed that monetary authorities in formulating their policy know the public's
expected rate of inf(ation. This means that the results of the decisions of policymakers
are crucially dependent on the numerical values of the intlationary expectations of the
public (a'). Owing to the fact that there exist two inElationary or monetary regimes
(a - 0 and a- 1) and two values with regard to inflationary expectauons of the public
(:t' - 0 and :t' - 1), each player of the game has four possible outcomes. These
pay-offs will be deduced with the aid of a simple numerical example.
If the monetaty authorities fix a zero rate of intlation, implementing a policy of
monetary stabiliry, then the following macroeconomic pay-offs will result (Table 1). If
in these circumstances the public expects a zero race of inflation ( z' - 0) the final
outcome will also be equal to zero. This monetary policy strategy prevents inflation and
does not involve a real effect ( production). However if the public takes into account an
expected rate of intlation equal to 1(:t' - 1), the policymaker's outcome will be equal
to -? because of the working of rhe negative Lucas' supply-effect. although there is no
intlanon, the real effecx will be negative with a contraaion m economic acnviry because
of a negauve surpríse intladon. However if the policymaker chooses an intlationary
policy ( z - 1), while the public expects a zero rare of inflation ( ;t' - 0), chen owmg ro
the positive Lucas' supply-effect the policymaker's outcome will be equal to 1. [n these
circumstances intlanon results but also a positive real effect m terms of an increase in
producrion and employment. [f in this policy regime the expected rate of inflation is also
equal to 1(:t' - 1) then the policymaker's outcome will be equal to -1. There is no real
effect and only inflation results. The surprise-effect with regard to production and
employment does not arise, but only the negative inflation effect will be obtained.
Based on thís simple numerical example it appears from the policymaker's view that
an inflationary policy is more advantageous than a policy of monetary stabiliry,
notwithstanding the inflationary expectations of the public. The macroeconomic
outcome of the inflationary-strategy of the policymaker ( 1, -1) is always better than
the zero rate inflationary-strategy (0, -2).
The ultimate results of the policymaker's strategies characzerized by alternative
values of the chosen monetary regime and alternacive valua of the expecxed rate of
inflation of the public can be summarized in the following matrix.
Table 1: Policymaker's Outcomes








Subsequently public's behavior has to be analyzed. ~s was alread,v put forward, it is
assumed that the public is always trying to prevent to be fooled by the policymaker. In
other words rational economic agents attempt to avoid a surprise inflacion (equation 3).
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This means thac the public does nor agree with a real wage rate that deviates from its
eqwlibnum level, featured by an acutal level of producrion thac equals the natural level
(YF - YH). In decermining their strategy it is assumed that economic agents know the
actual rate of intlation (z). Based on the expcrience from the past the public knows the
policymaker's prioriry of production and employment above monetary stabiliry
(anti-inflation poliey). Therefore economic agents assume that the strategy of cheatíng
with a concomitant surprise inflacion will always be followed (n - 1). For this
inflanonary policy, as was mentioned before, gives the best outcome for the
policymaker. This information leads to an expected positive rate of inflation by the
public (:t' - 1). The ultimate result of this public behavior for the polieymaker's
outcome is equal to -1 (see Table 1) and according to equation (3) equal to zero for che
public (see Table 2).
The ultimate outcomes of the public, given the choice-strategies of the polieymaker,
can be rendered as follows.
Table 2: Outcomes of thc Public








:ictu~l policy Expectacions of che public
zcro-intlation positive inflanon
zero-mFlation Parero-equilibrium Time-inconsistency
(pre-commitment) YF - YN YF ~ Y;~
z-n'-0 rzcn'




Based on the foregoing consideratioas it appears that in the final (rarional)
equilibrium, charaaerized by a non-cooperarive game wirh full informanon of che
public and the policymaker, inflation always occurs. This results from the facz rhat
basGd on the fixed intlationary expectacions of the public, policymakers will always be
tempted to cheat the public by organizing a surprise intlation aimed ac incceasing
production and employment. However from a monetary poliey view chís outcome is
not sansfactory. For in these circumstances an eqwlibrium situanon occurs (Yp - YN)
with an intlationary-bias (;t - a' - 1), a socalled Nash-equtlibnum, which is infecior to
a Pareto-optimal-equilibrium, with a zero rate of inflauon (a -;t' - 0). This
Nash-equilibrium wifl be obtained in a non-cooperanve game ( no pre-commiunent), in
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which each plaver's straregy is opnmal given the other's strategy. The hierarchy of the
players is equal. The ~Iash-equilibrium is the onlg sustatnable equilibnum that wtll arise
when the policymaker has changed his origlnal optimal plan and thece is no room left
for a surprise intlation'-).
The "Time Inconsistencv" Problem
In the foregoing sub-seaion it was put forward that a monetary policy which does
not take into accounr the reaczions and expectations of the public with regard to future
monetary policy will generate a worse result than a policy based on fixed rules. In this
way the question of "time inconsisteney" in monetary poGcy came about, which can be
explained as follows.
The temptanon of policymakers to cheat the public and to take advantage ofa change
in their strategy is always existent, notwithstanding the numerical values of the
intlationary expectations of the public. However because of the fact that the public has
learned from experience the incentive structure of the policvmaker with regard to
production and employment, rational agents will not err systematically and will expect
a positive rate of inflation (;t' ~ 0). In other words when the public has got to know the
polictimaker's strategy, the authorities can not use rhe tactic of organizing a surprise
intlation svstematically to stimulate economic activity. [t may be obvious that this game
theorenc view links up with Friedman's fixed monetary growth rule as well as wtth the
policy implications of the rational expectations theory. The behavior of the public,
charaaerized by anticipating the policymaker's preference, will stimulate authorines to
implement actually an inflationary policy to maintain production and employment on
the natural level. Ultimately a vertical Phillipscurve results on the natural level of
unemployment. For if in these circumstances policymakers do not accomodate the
expectations of the public a negative surprise inflation (z e z') with a concomitant
contraccion in economic activiry will occur which is considered as a negative
macro-economic outcome (see Table 1).
This monetary policy strategy (inIlation-scenario) and the concomitant public
behavior will generate the same level of employment (YF - Yh) as would be the case
with a monetary growth rule (zero-inflation scenario). However the actual rate of
inflation will be higher implying a poorer macroeconomic result. For as was pointed out
in the previous section the outcome n- n' - 1(Nash-equilibrium) is inferior to the
outcome a- a' - 0(Pareto-equilibrium). In this context Kydland and Prescott (1977,
p. ~t74-475) remark, "... the resulting policy was consistent but suboptimaL It was
consistent in the sense that at each point in time the policy selected was best, given the
current situation", and further on, "Doing what is best, given the current situation,
results in an excessive level of inflacion, but unemploymenc is no lower than it wotild be
if inflation (possibly deElation or price stabiliry) were at the social optimal rate".
The dilemma described by Kydland and Prescott that the optimal monetary poliey
strategy (zero-inflation) is time-inconsistent, while the time-consistent inflationary
z) In the literature on game theory a socallcd Stackclberg-equilibrium refers to a non-
'cooperarive game with a certain hierarchy in the structure, in which one of the players, the leader,
takes rhe ininative and the others follow. If there is no monetary-policy rule (precommitment), also
in this game the Ieader will always be stimulated to cheac the other players by changing the initial
policy strategy to benefit from higher production and employment. Ultimately the leader will loose
his dominant position and a Nash-équilibrium will arise.
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policy (discretion) is sub-oprimal has strongly stimulated further research in the field oE
policy-credibiliry. The issue of credibiliry and the concomitant problem of "time-
inconsisteney" can be formulaced as follows. Before the public has made its choice with
regard to inflationary expeaations, a parcial optimal monetary policy strategy will
elicit a reacrion from the public. This implies ex-post thar the reaaion on this initial
optimal policy may be quite different from rhe reaaion the policymaker was expecting.
In other words in this way the policymaker will be confronted wich quite another
environment, because the public need not react in such a mechanical way as was
assumed in the traditional macrceconomic models ( Lucas-cricique). This means that in
this new sicuation policymakers will be stimulated co change their original optimal
strategy and so renege on the initial plan, incroducing the poliey-credibilirv problem. [n
this context Persson points ouc (1988, p. .i 20) "Presenc some imperfection which makes
the ex-ante optimal policy a?nd besc rather than a 1 st best outcome, there is an ex-post
incentive to deviations from the ex-ante policy", and further on "Therefore those
policies that would be optimal if binding commirments could be made, face a credibilitv
problem because of the incencive for ex-posc deviations. Forward-looking rational
agencs only believe a policy announcement that will be optimal to carry ouc
ex-post".
[n other words the temptation of policvmakers to drive the economv in the direction
of the " first best" solution will ultimatelv drive rhe equilibrium from the "second best"
co the " third best" solution because of the interaction process between the policvmaker
and the public. In economic literature this development is known as the "cime-
inconsisrencv" problem'). The concept of "time-inconsistencv" refers ro the rempta-
rion of policymakers to deviate from their original plan when they rxpect that rauonal
economic zgents will take into account this policy in their behavior. ~Iaintaining policy
credibilicy in the sense of ex-post opnmality or time-consistent behavior of policyma-
kers means an addirional constraint to the policv problems confroncing central banks.
This implies that in each period policymakers have to determine rheir optimal strates,,ry
based on the infiationary expectations and decision rules of rhe public. In this wav
policy will be endogenous. ~
Barro and Gordon point out that in the ultimate rational equilibrium situauon the
monetary authorities can choose any desired rate of intlation. However if the cedibiliry
of policymakers can be guaranteed beforehand, for example by way of the introduction
of a monetary policy rule ( precommitment) binding the central banks in their policy
behavior, the optimal solution ( zero-inflation scenario) can be achieved. For in case of
an absence of such an institution or of issuing a credibiliry-guarantee by the central
bank a positive rate of inflation and a sub-optimal solurion will result ( Nash- or
discretionary equilibrium).
Theretore Kydland and Prescott emphasize the significance of fixed rules in monetary
policy which signal credibiliry of policymakers. This preference for rules above
discretion in monetary policy and its concomitant "inflationary bias" is essentially
based on the fact that the economic system cannor be characterized as a"black-box"
with á given dynamic structure. This means that the current decisions of economic
~) See, Cbnri, 1938, p. 18, where he notts, "... To re-evaluate the policymakers calculare the
opumal poGcirs in precisely the same way they had done at rhe original dare. [f the oprimal policies
chosen at the futurr date coincide wich the original plan, the policymakers wiil snck ro rhar plan,
and the policy regime is "time consisrenr". If however, rhe policymakers wanr ro renege on rhe
origmal plan, the policits of rhe regime are "rime inconsistent".
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agents are conditioned by their future expectations. Therefore when monetary
authorities in formulacing thcir optimal monetary policy ignore the racional behavior of
the public, atterwards it will appear thac the original policy has co be changed.
It is obvious that a monetary policy behavior characterized by cheating the public is
not cime-consistenc and will deteriorate policymaker's credibility and increase the
uncertainty in the econo:ny. However a policy behavior which is cime-consistent will be
credible and predictable giving a real contribution to an eliminacion of inflation. The
message of Kydland and Prescott is pointed out by McCallum in the following way, "...
Thus the surprise magnitude is zero on the avecage, over any large number of periods,
even rhough the monetary authoriry views it as controllable in each period. The
discretionary outcome, it is clear, features more inflation but the same amount of
surprise inflacion (on the average) as under a rule. Accordingly to chis model, then, a
discretionary mode of policy behavior by the monerary authority leads to consequences
that are unambiguously poorer than would obtain (for the same economy and the same
objectives) under rule-like behavior". (McCallum, 198~, p. 11~). The most important
feature of a policy-rule refers to the fact that in this way future monetary policy
behavior is clearly fixed and a discretionary policy wich its relatively sub-optimal
macroeconomic outcome can be avoided. For assuming a fluctuating monetary regime,
each period [he monetary authoricy will be confronted with the inflacion-unemploy-
ment trade-off and will act accordingly. However because of the fact that the public
knows the policvmaker's preference for production and employment above price
stabilicy, a systematic surprise inflation cannot occur. Based on the informacion about
poficy behavior the racional economic agents will adjust their intlationary expectanons
to eliminare a consistent pattern of surprise inflation. ~ discretionary policy behavior
featured by erratic changes in the monetary regime does noc offer the public a guarantee
concerning che future behavior of monecary authorities. Therefore an inscitucional
change (an independent central bank) or a monetary contract between che policymaker
and the public with regard to polir behavior (price- or money supply-rule) will be
necessary to prevent potential ex-post "surprises" and the concomitant discrecionary
outcomes and to re-establish credibiliry. If such a restructuring of the institurions or rhe
introduction of a formal rule is difficult or impossible to realize, then che question
comes about whether it may be possible to find a more informal discipline-mechanism
that can replace a precommitment or a binding contract. In these circumstances it might
be possible that building up a reputation by policymakers and the concomitanc
reputational forces can give a solution. For a loss of credibility, as will be described
further on, will imply substantial macroeconomic costs and will bc punished by the
public.
Shortly the foregoing discussions can be summarized in the following scheme.
In the eighties the game theorctlt approach, introduced by Kydland and Prescott, has
stimulated furcher research in the field of the "time-inconsistency problem" in
monecary policy. In this context the building up of a reputation by central banks and the
significance of asymmetric information is emphasized. This means that the public needs
sufficient information to get to know the true idenciry of the policymaker (preference:
inflation or employment). When thc policymaker has obtained the reputation to be a
"strong" policymaker giving no room for inflationary processes, the public knows the
identiry and can determine its inflationary expectations in a rather simple way.
However as far as che policymakers have the disposal of private information
(asymmetric information), the scope for organizing a surprise inflation will be
increased.
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3. Asymmetsic In~ormation
Reputacional Forces
In the foregoing section it was assumed chac policymakers and the pub(ic have the
disposal of the same informacion-set. In practice, however, this is mostly noc the case so
that a sicuation of asymmecric informaàon exísts. This means that the public does noc
know which kind of policymaker wiU be the opponent in the game and the policymaker
in his curn does not know public's behavior with regard to inflacionary expectacions
and che concomitant wage-demands. For a new monetary authoriry may have quite
anocher pceference with regard co che macroeconomic crade-off between intladon and
employment chan its predecessor. This involves uncertainry and imperfect information
wich the public altering the macroeconomic outcome consequent on a change in the
monecary-regime. Moreover the Kydland-Prescott' analysis assumes a one-shot game,
while in praaíce the central bank has a time-horizon induding several periods. This last
sicuation refers to a repeaced game or a socalled supergame in which the strategic
behavior of che player is dependent on the behavior of the other player in the past. This
means thac in their aetual decision making all playecs have to take into account the
future consequences of the current decisions. In this way during such a repeated game a
periodic optimalisation is not possible because of the fact that in chosing the
policy-scrategy the memory and che experiences of the players play an essential
role.
Backus and Driffill have shown the consequences with regard co the macroeconomic
outcomes of a repeaced game (Backus and Driffill, 1985 a-b and Michener, 1989).
These auchors assume a model with a"weak" and a"strong" policymaker. The
reasoning goes as follows. The public does not know che rype of policymaker and has co
gacher information about its idenciry. If the monetary authority is "weak" the
macroeconomic outcomes in Table 1 will result. ln chac case the policymaker has
always a scrong incenàve to organize an inflaàonary shock to obtain the. short-term
benefits in terms of production and employmenc. However if the monecary authoriry is
"strong" and independent, giving no room for disueàonary acàons, then a zero rate of
inflation will always bc preferred. Private agencs know that the policymaker may be
either of these rypes but they are ignoranc of which rype they are actually facing. Under
such circumstances there is an incenàve for the "weak" policymaker to masquerade as a
"strong" policymaker aiming at a downward adjusunent of inflaàonary expeccacions
by the public.
The following assumpàon with regard to public behavior can be made. In the
beginning the public assuma that the policymaker is "strong" and cherefore will follow
an anci-inflaàonary poliey. However the public is uncertain and does not know whether
this anà-inflaàonary policy will actually bs implemented or the srrategy will be aimed
at manipulating the inflaàonary expectaáons. On the conarary "weak" policymakers
will always be tempced (possibly under poliàcal pressure) co inElate to generate the
desired real effects in che short run. Because they incend co maXimi~e che objective
function (social welfare function) over several periods, iniàally they Qy to masquerade
as a"strong" policymaker to eliminace or to prevent a rekindling of inflacionary
expectààons. For in a worldof raàonal expectations toobcain credibiliry with regard to
the expeaed monetary policy changes will be rewarded or, as Taylor (1982, p. 81)
points ouc, "direaly reduce the costs of disintlacion by changing inflauonary
expeccacions". In this way an inflanonary expectaàons-effect results through policy-
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credibility. This means that during a certain period the "weak" policymaker will be
prepared to sacrifice the short-term benefits of a surprise intlation (investment in
credibility) to build up a long-run reputaàon. In ocher words a"stock" of reputation
will be build up, which can be used in the future if possibly the policymaker wanes to
give prioriry to a sàmulation of economic activiry. [n these circumstances in their
ex-post decisions policymakers will be faced with a socalled reputational trade-off
(Persson, 1988). The higher the prioriry given to a building up of reputation, the greater
the sacrifice in terms of a loss of real effeas in the short run and vice versa. The public is
watching monetary authoriàes continuously and wants to find ouc whecher or not they
stick to their initial anti-inflationary intentiuns. Economic agents try to unmask the
policymaker to determine its true identiry.
During this learning-process the public will gradually revise the belief thac the
policymaker is "strong" dependenc on the actual pace of int7acion. This degree of
adjustment can be considered as a measure of poliey-credibiliry. [n this context
credibiliry and the concomitanc build up of a reputacion can be understood as
time-dependent state variables.
As long as monetary auchoricies are able to eliminate inflation and so stick to cheir
initial intentions, the public will update the belief thac the policymaker is "strong"
increasing its reputation. lf however at some time the policymaker appears to be
"weak" by accepcing inflation and implemencing a discrecionary policy, the. public will
punish this strategy-change immediately. This implies that the reputation will be lost
direaly revealing the true idenciry of the policymaker. This view is also pointed out by
the presidenc of the Ducch central bank, as he states, "?~ high race of inflation will be
incorporated in the minds and expettations of the public and eliminaàng these
expectations costs time. Therefore the elimination of an existenc inflacionary process is
difficult and more costly than an avoidance of inflation" (Duisenberg, 1989,
p. 19).
[f there is a final cime-horizon and full information the reputational-mechanism can
not occur. For in a finite horízon game the policy maker will always raise intlation in the
final period having no incentive to invest further in building up a repucaàon. However
racional economic agents do understand this stracegy and will raise their inflacionary
expectarions accordingly. Subsequently this reaction motivates the authorities to
organize a surprise inflation in che penultimate period. But inflaàonary expectarions
will be raised in this period as well preventing the arise of real effects. In this situation
the game unravels backwards ulàmately resulting in a discrecionary or single stage
Nash-equilibrium in all periods. This view comes from the theory of induscrial
organization and is known as the socalled "chain store paradox" (Blackburn and
Christensen, 1989). This implies that the working of the reputation-effect will only
o~cur in a repeated game when tbere exists asytnmetric informaàon between the
policymaker and che public.
A game theoreàc analysis about the working of the reputaáonal mechanism has been
puc forward by Kreps and Wilson in the field of industrial organization and imperfect
compeàtion. It deals with the question about whether or not entry occuts in a
monopolistic market and in this context these authors talk about a"sequenàal
équilibrium". It refers to a"subgame perfection" in a repeated game which ensures that
the Nash-equilibrium condition in the Kydland-Prescott sense is satisfied in every stage
of the game. This situacion has the properry that the optimal strategy for each player is
his equilibríum strategy, regardless of the previous strategy-choiccs of the other players.
[n this concext Kreps and Wilson remark, "So each player will be willing to carry out its
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scracegy at every point in the game, if ever it is called upon to do so" (Kreps and Wilson,
1982, p. 2~ï). Essennally ic deals with an inreraction process in a repeated game
between the strategic behavior of policymakers and a d,vnamic Bayesian learning-
process of the public. It is obvious thac such a process will arise when in the course of
time new policymakers come in. ln these circumstances the public is trying to find out
and to learn the new policy-regime and co accounc for in its current decisions. During
such a learning-period, indicaced by Taylor as a"transition co rational expeaacions",
che meaning of reputatíon of policymakers comes abouc very sharply. In a very early
stage a new policymaker can build up credibility and reputation by clearly revealing ics
anti-inflacionary policy by organizing a restrictive monetary policy and even by
accepting a contraetion of economic activiry.
The Backus-Driffill' analysis is restriaed in thac sense that che policymaker will be
idencified bv the public eicher as a"weak" or as a"scrong" policymaker. Therefore
when reputacion has disappeared it can not be build up again. This is a very scrong
assumption. For if policymakers have revealed a bad behavior in the past it does noc
mean that chis will always be the case in the future. ~fter the strong int7acionary
developmenc in the sevencies monetary authonties in the United Staces as well as in
ochtr industrialized countries have been able to change cheir policies and to reduce the
aaual intlacion and the inflationarv expeccacions. In chis concext it is inceresting to nore
thac the German central bank, which is a very independenc monetary authonry, has
alwavs poinced ouc very clearlv ics preference for monecary stabiliry and has been
successful in maintaining intlation and inflationary expectations on a relativel,v low
leveL [n this wav the Bundesbank has generated credibiliry on internarional financial
markecs and has build up the reputation of a"strong" policymaker and a stable
monetan~ anchor in the financial world~).
The Reputational Equilibrium
In the novel licerature on game-cheory it is puc forward how building up a repucation
through the implemencation of a pre-announced anti-inflacionary policy is a possibiliry
co reduce rhe social costs (the loss oE employment) connected wich the elimination of
inflation. In this concext Persson remarks, "Repucation may thus, fully or partly,
substicute for formal precommicments, and lower or eliminate the costs of the
credibiliry problem" (Persson, 1988, p. 522). This issue has been investigaced in a
repeaced game by Barro and Gordon. In their analysis monetary auchorities will build
up a reputation which to a cercain excent can generate the same credibiliry-effeas as an
institutionally fixed monetary policy-rule. [n this way the inferior macroeconomic
ouccomes of a discrecionary policy as described before can be improved or even
avoided. The new issue in the Barro-Gordon analysis refers to the development of a
reputacional-mechanism, which can prevent the extreme options of a formal precom-
mitment of a zero inflacion-rule on the one hand and the discrerionary outcome
(inflanon wichouc real effects) on che other hand. Their analysis does not deal wich an
') [n the game theoretic literature Vickers (1986) points out the meaning of a signalling-effect.
This refers co the facz chac in the begirtning of the game che "scrong" policymaker will choose such a
low rare of intlanon (even a recession) char the "weak" policymaker (a high-inElauon rype) will be
decerred to masquerade him. This means rhac just from the beginning a clear signal will be given to
the public abouc che true idennry of the policymaker faced with during the game. It also implies
~hat in th~s way che process of unmasking the "weak" policymaker can bc avoided.
246 J. J. SIJBEN
elaboration of the theoretical issues mentioned before, but with the introduction of the
working of the reputacion-effect, which supports the realisaáon of a rule-equilibrium
(zero-inflaáon) as well as muigates che incentive to cheat the public The Barro-Gordon
contribution to che time-inconsiscency problem in monetary policy refers to the
introduction of a reputational scrategy. This strategy makes it possible to regain
panially the loss of credibiliry caused by discretionary aaions. This socalled
~rigger-mechanism describes how private sector inflationary expectations are revised in
a rational way in response to the observed course of the actual inflationary process. In
this way a connection will arise between the actual strategy-choice of policymakers
with regard to employmenc and inflation on the one side and the concomitant
inElationary expeaations of the public on che other side. [n building up a reputation
central banks can avoid the inferior, sub-optimal, macroeconomic Nash-solution of a
(consistenc) discretionary policy.
The potencial loss of repucation will enforce che policymaker in an informal way to
stick to the pre-announced monerary poliey regime and secure a lower future average
rate of inElation. The working of the reputational mechanism will mitigate the incentive
to cheat che public, as was mentioned in the Kydland-Prescott analysis, and in any way
will reduce the degree of non-cooperarive discretionary actions. Barro and Gordon
clear(y point out that in case temptation (the incentive to organize a sucprise inflacion
with its concomitanc shott-run real effects) is equal to the enforcement (the avoidance
of a loss of reputation), the policymaker will stick to the pre-announced policy regime.
However iE this is not the case priority will be given to cheating the public wich a
concomitant loss of reputation and inferior macroeconomic outcomes in the future. In
this way policymakers will be faced with quite a new trade-off, namel,v cheacing rhe
public with real benefits in the short run versus a loss of reputation in the long run. For
based on the game theoretic view cheating today implies higher inflanonary
expeccations tomorrow.
Barro and Gordon were stimulaced to look for a more informal mechanism which
could avoid or improve the sub-optimal Nash-solution. They put forward thac in a
monetary environment characterized by symmetric information the authorities must be
deterred from cheating the public. The basic reasoning of the reputaáonal-strategy
mentioned before refers to the following. The public has to fix the inElationary
expectacions in such a way that the policymakers will be restrained to choose a
discretionary policy or a surprise inflation. In other words the concomicant potenáal
loss of reputation has to enforce the authorities to be reluctant to cheat the public. In
this context Barro points out, "Generally, a credible rule comes with some enforcement
power chac at leasc balances the temptation to cheat. We consider here only tha
enforcement that arises from the potential loss of reputaáon" (Barro, 1983 a). The
working of the reputational-mechanism can be desccibed as Eollows. Assume the ceneral
bank announces a rate of inflacion which is lower than the inflaáon rate according to a
discretionary policy. In chese circumstances che public is watching the cencral bank wich
regard to its actual behavior and will fix the inflaáonary expectaáons in the following
way. tf in the previous period the actual rate of inflaáon was in accordance wich the
current inflationary expectations, the public will believe the policymaker and will
maincain this expected rate of inflaáon in the next period. This means thac che
policymaker will keep its reputation of being a"strong" policymaker. However if in the
last period the public has been faced with a surprise inflaáon, then the raáonal
economic agents hold the view that this discretionary poliey will be continued. In other
words when auchorities were cheating the public this policy behavior will be punished
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in the next period by a lossof reputaáon. So the public can not be fooled systematically.
This implies thac the policymaker has to pay for the shorc-term benefits of cheating in
che previous period at a price equal to a loss of rcpucaáon in che fucure. Then in
subsequent periods a non-cooperaáve game will aáse wich a sub-opcimal Nash-
equilibrium. Barro and Gordon also explain thac in these circumstances the public
behavior of scill sticking co a zero-inflaáon rule must be considered as irracional. Foc it
is assumed that the public knows che policymaker's objective funcrion. Therefore che
incenáve co cheac is always greaccr chan the pocenáal loss of repucacion, making ic
impossible to enforce the ideal rule of zero-inflacion.
The monetary authority will maximize ia objeczive funcáon explicitly caking into
accounc the racional behavior of the public. In considcring whecher to organize a
surprise inflaáon today with ics concomitant short-run real effects or not the following
trade-off results. The policymaker compares che current macroeconomic ouccome
resulting from a surprise inflation of the public (:t ~ rt') with the outcome generated by
the inflation rate which is in accordance wich che expected rate of inflacion ( n - n`). In
this comparison attenáon is paid co che present valuoof the maaoeconomic costs in che
next period which emerge from the faa that the cheated-public will adjust its
inflacionary expectations upwards eliminaáng the initial real effects. As was poinced
out before the public assumes that the policvmaker will continue its discretionary
acáons (a 1 z' ). :~s long as the present value of these costs (deterrent-effect) are greater
rhan the short-cerm benefits in cerms of an improvement of employmenc ( cemptacion-
effect), the policymaker will change [he monetary regime and will choose a lower rate of
inflacion chan is in accordance with a discrecionary policy.
Based on these two monecary policy opcions Bazro and Gordon deduce che lowest but
credible race of inflaáon. This rate is higher than the zero-rate of inflation according to a
precommicment rule on che one side buc is Íower than the rate of intlacion which
emerges from a discretionary policy on the other side. In this contexc the auchors point
out, "We look here for che best enforceable rule - that is, che one chat minimizes
expected costs, subject co che constraint chac che enforcement be at least as good as the
tempcaáon" ( Barro and Gordon, 1983 a, p. 110. In this way the concomitant rate of
monetary gtowth ( race of inflation) is a weighced average of the zero-inflacion
(precommitment) and the rate of inflaáon thac results from discrecionary monecary
actions. This weighted rate of inflacion is also dependent on the policymaker's discount
rate, which refleas chac the fucure macroeconomic outcome is related to the current
policy aczions. ~ high discounc rate implies chat a relacively high weight is attached to a
stimulaáon of economic activiry involving a higher rate of inflation. In these
circumstances the role of the reputaáonal-mechanism is weakened and a discretionary
policy becomes more credible. However if the rate of discounc is lower che
precommicment rule will be more credible and the working of che reputacional-
mechanism will be stronger. Such a rule of behavior wich regard co monecary policy will
be enforceable due to the reputation-effect àndwill stimulate thc policymaker to a more
cooperaáve behavior. The policymaker will stick to chis ecleccic-rule of behavior when
the costs in the next period arc ac least equal to the benefits in che previous period. When
this tnechanism ofdeterrence or of reputaáon-loss once has been staned, the aimed goal
will be realized actually. For the public is believing chat the policymaker will pursue and
realize~ this weighted rate of inflaáon. This means that wich the absencc of a
prccomtrutn~enc rule with an optimal zero-inflation, a second-besc soluáon wich a more
credible ( low) rate of inflarion can be obtained by incorporating a repucational-
mechanism. In this way a repucanonal equilibrium results increasing the credibiliry of
?48 J. J. SIJBEN
the central bank. Barro and Gordon come to che conclusion that in these circumstances
of a reputational-equilibrium the monecary authoriry announces a socalled "mid-
value" of che rate of intlacion which on the one hand is lower than ics discretionary
value and which on the other hand is positive. [n this concext chey remark, "Whether
the ceputacional equilibrium will arise depends on the policymaker's weighing of the
benefics from the two possible modes of behavior" (Barro and Gordon, 1983,
p. 604-605 }.
The authors are also looking for an enforceable rule in a situacion charaaerized by
asymmecric informacion, whereby the public does not know che prioriry and che
discount rate of che policymaker. They also show rhac wich asymmetric information
this rule is a weighted average of the ideal (zero-inflacion) rule and che inflacionary
ouccome connected with a discrecionary policy. However in these circumstances che
actual race of inflation changes with alterations in the prionry and in che discounc rate.
This implies thac a higher prioricy given to employment and a higher race of discounc
will be accompanied by a higher unexpec7ed race of inflacion. Conversely, policymakers
will emphasize credibiliry and will invest in repucacion. In this context they poine out,
"Conversely, the policymaker "bites the bullet" - that is, creates negacive inflation
shocks" (Barro and Gordon, 1983 a, p. 118). In this way some scope will be built up for
a fucure surprise intlacion when ac some cime higher prioriry may be given to a
stimulation of economic activiry.
Taylor is criticizing rhis view and has some doubts abouc the meaning of the
repucational-mechanism in a socalled positive theory of inflation. He remarks, "The
fact that 1 suboprimallv high inftation rate is the only credible policy has been offered by
Barro and Gordon as a reason why we have experienced high intlacion rates in recenr
years. To some extent the incroduction of repucarion-effects inco che time inconsiscency
model makes ic less attractive as a positive theory of inflationary políey: the larger are
the reputation effects (for example che longer they last) the closer is the equilibrium
inflation rate to zero" and further on, "In other well-recognized time inconsistency
situacions, sociery seems to have found ways to institute che optimal (cooperative)
policy" (Taylor, 1983, p. 125).
Subsequendy Canzoneri poincs ouc chac in che Barro-Gordon repucational equilib-
rium the rate of inflacion will be constanc. According to him this is a rather odd
conclusion because in practice it can be observed that in the course of cime the rate of
intlation as well as che rate of monecary growth are altering substantially. He remarks,
"The first weakness is that the Barro-Gordon solutton is, like Rogoff's too stable. If
taken literally, it implies thac one should never expecr to see reversions to inflationary
periods" (Canzoneri, 1985, p. 1064 and Rogoff, 1985). Moreover he states that the
working of che reputational-mechanism is crucially dependent on the assumed
punishmenc-strategy (loss of repucation) by the public. Therefore che monetary policy
game wich an infinite horizon ischarnaerized by several Nash-equilibria, buc there is no
mechanism available explaining which choice will have to be made (Backus and Driffill,
1985).
Cukierman and Melczer (1986) have further elaborated the role of asymmecric
information in the context of the rules versus discretion debace. They emphasize the
inEluence of stochastic exogenous shocks which may give an informational advancage
io one of the players. Shortly their view refers co che fullowing. in the course of cime the
marginal preference of policymakers with regard to inElation and employment can
change substannall,v thcough unexpected events. [n this way the public will be faced
with policy-uncertainty. Based on observed changes in the iate of monetary growth
Monecary Policy in a Game Z49
privare agents cannoc deduce immediacely which part of chese changes refers to a more
scrucrural change in the policy regime and whích parc has to be ascribed co the
imprecision with regard to controlling the money supply. In their analysis policy-
credibility is no (áme dependenc) scate-variable, but will be determined by the speed
with which privace agents realize rhat a shift in the polieymaker's preferences has caken
place. This learning-process will be shortened and credibiliry will be higher the greater
the precision of monecary concrol and vice versa.
In case of a precise monetary concrol some periods of monecary contraction will be
sufficient to convince the public that the race of monetary growth wíll be reduced
permanently and that the policy-regime has been changed. Therefore inflationary
expectations will be revised downwards very soon. [n chis contexc the authors point
out, "In this case a"cold turkey" disinflationary poliey is preferable to "gradualism"
since a larger decrease in monetary expansion generates credibiliry relatively quick"
(Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986, p. 1121). However if the precision of monetary control
is very Iow, the public will be uncertain and unable to decide about a possible
policy-shift based on the observed money supply figures. [n these circumscances the
obtainment of credibiliry with regard to a disinflationary policy takes a long time and
the social costs in terms of unemployment will be higher propornonally. Then a poliey
of gradualism has co be preferred, enabling the public to adjust its expectacions
gradually with lower social coscs. Subsequently che authors point ouc that under certain
circumstances policymakers will be moávated to aim ar a cenain amount of ambiguity
and secrecv in monetary poliey,.increasing asymmetric information. This means that
policymakers may use the precision of monetary control as a policy inscrument to cheat
the public and to regain some scope for scabilisacion policy.
~. Summarizing Conclusions
In che preceding secáons a broad, non-technical, survey has been presented of the
novel game-theoretic view with regard to the classical debate about rules versus
discretion in monetary policy. In the tradiáonal theory about macroeconomic
stabilization poliey ic was cuscomary to assume that policy-behavior of the cencral bank
was exogenously given. This also impGed that the structure of the economic model
would noc change and che public would react to certain poliey actions in a predicrable
and rather mechanical way to achieve a desired course of economic activicy. In ocher
words economic policy-making was considered as a"game against nature". However
in the recent cheoretical consideraáons with regard to cencral bank behavior,
sámulated by the Lucas-criáque, actenáon is explicidy given to the role of che
incenáves, the constraints and the information of both polieymakers and the rational
public with regard to che ultimace maaoeconomic outcomes of monetary policy. In the
game theoretic approach the fotmulaáon of monetary policy has become less easy
beca,use the model is characterized by a strategic game, confronting the central bank
with raáonal private agents. This new approach, which has also been applied in ocher
fields of economics, poincs out thac the interaction process between the behavior of the
cencral bank and the public will ulcimately result in an "inflaáonary bias", i.e. a
sub-opámal macroeconomic ouccome (Nash-equilibrium). In this way the "time-
inconsisteney" problem and the relaced policy-credibiliry comes abouc. This problem
essenáally refers to the fac7 that in the course of áme, due to the reaction of the public,
policymakers will be rempced to change their original opámal policy-stracegy with
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regard to the inflation-unemployment trade-off. There always exisu an incenáve of
polieymakers to cheat the public by organizing an inflaáonary-shock, aimed at
obcaining short-run benencs in terms of an improvemenc of production and employ-
ment. [f the ultimate ouccome of monetary policy is also dependenc on public behavior,
the policymaker's abiliry to change its original plan has two consequences. Pnmarily if
che public knows that the policymaker might change its original incentions (incentive to
cheac), it will act in the decision-making process as if rhe policymaker is actually
implementing the policy shift. Then this informacion will face the policymaker wich a
difficult choice at the moment che new policy has co be implemenced. Eicher the original
plan will be changed, given the new economic environmenc, (time-inconsiscency) or the
policymaker is giving prioriry to the long-run benefics in terms of credibiliry and
reputation and will scick to the original opámal plan. Therefore the opcimal poliey
mighc become rime-inconsistenc, resulting in a loss of credibiliry and repucaáon. In
section 3 the asymmecric informacion in the game cheoretic Eramework is emphasized,
dealing wich che crucial concepts of credibiliry and reputation of the policymaker.
Due to the experiences wich severe inflacions in the seventies, recenc economic
research on che rules versus discretion debare is strongly emphasizing the role of
policy-credibiliry and reputaáon of central banks to prevent a rekindling of inflacion.
This development has revitalized the old concroversy abouc rules in monetary policy
versus discrecionary monecary aaions. The "time-inconsistency" problem is re-
emphasizing very clearly thac che concepts of uncertainry, informacion and expecta-
tions play a significanc role in the inceraaion process between the polieymaker and che
public and therefore are very crucial for the ultimace course of the economic process.
The empirical research in the field of credibiliry and reputation wich regard to monecary
policy is still in its infaney and many problems have to be resolved. (Baxtec, 1985,
Blanchard, 1984). The hypochesis of "time inconsisteney" has also to be tested
empirically. This might be realized by regarding che evidence of a systematic "inflation
bias" in those countries where the central bank is less independenc and more
subservient to the government.
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Summary
The purpose of this paper is co give a non-technical review oE the currenc issues in the
international lirerature with regard to che game-theoreác approach in monecary policy. Aher the
~Lucas-Sargent-Wallace ineffectiveness hypothesis in the sevencies a new policy-issue came abou[
dealing with the nme-inconsistency of policy makers. This quesáon is closely rela[ed [o ché
concepts of policy-credibiliry and reputation of ceneral banks. According co the game-cheoreác
approach the interarnon process between the s[racegic behaviour of the policymaker and the
rauonal public w:ll resulc m an endogenous mone[ary poliey. This implies that a discreáonary
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poGcy has to bc abandoned, because the long-run outcomes in terms of inflation and employmenc
will bc less benefiaal (Nash-eqwlibnum! rhan in [he case of a precommirment in mone[ary policy
(rule).
Zusammen~assung
Dieser ~lrrikel versucht eine nich[-technische Ubcrsicht uber in dcr íncernarionalen Lirerarur
diskuticrte Anwendungen der Spielthcorie auf geldpolinsche Fragestellungen zu gcben (Debatte
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digkcic und Repuration von Zencralbanken verbunden. Der spielcheorecischen Analyse zufolge
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agierenden Óffendichkeit zu eincr cndogen dccermimerten Gcldpolitik. Dies impliziert, daó man
diskredonàre Politik aufgeben mud, weil ihre langfrisrigen Resultace bezuglich [ntla[ion und
Bescháhigung schlechter wáren (Nash-G(eichgewich[) als díe riner er ~nce angekiindig[en
Gledmengenregel.
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